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ABSTRACT 
 
Trusts are an essential tool for estate planning. The interest in trust structures by 
taxpayers has increased over the years and the South African Revenue Services 
(‘SARS’) and National Treasury (‘NT’) have placed trusts on their agenda due to their 
perceived tax avoidance resulting from the use of trust structures. Section 7C was 
introduced into the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (as amended) (‘the Act’) in order to curb 
the avoidance of estate duty. However, the work undertaken by SARS and NT over the 
years and the insertion of this section in the Act, created an impression that there is 
avoidance of taxation through the use of trust structures. This study will interrogate the 
provisions of s 7C in order to determine the effectiveness of this section in curbing the 
avoidance of estate duty and/or tax through the use of trust structures. The well thought 
out manner in which this section was drafted and the existence of other tax provisions in 
the Act which pertain to trusts and the funding mechanisms of trusts suggest that this 
new inclusion is a convenient and easy manner to monitor the abuse by SARS and NT 
and subsequently curb the perceived abuse. The interplay of this section with ss 7 and 
31 of the Act indicate a risk of unintended double taxation. This and the circumvention 
options that taxpayers may embark on are matters that may render the section 
ineffective, although it is evidenced that this section closes that last door that remained 
open for taxpayers in respect of funding a trust.   
 
 
Key Words: Tax avoidance, estate duty avoidance, National Treasury, SARS, National 
Budget Speech, Davis Tax Committee Reports on estate duty, Interest-free and low 
interest loans, Affected Transactions (s 31), Donor attribution rules (s 7), Donations and 
donations tax, Double taxation.  
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1. PRELIMINARY MATTER 
 
South African residents have been and continue to make use of trusts as part of their 
estate planning. In setting up trusts and depending on the needs of the taxpayer, 
various structures are put in place. SARS and NT developed an uncorroborated view to 
the effect that there is estate duty and tax avoidance arising from the use of trust 
structures, where the loudest noise was mainly in respect of tax avoidance. Although in 
principle, s 7C is aimed at curbing the avoidance of estate duty, the journey to the 
promulgation of this section was mainly lead by a perceived view that there is an 
avoidance of taxation. As such, the study will mainly focus on the avoidance of tax and 
aspects relating to the avoidance of estate duty will indirectly form part of the study. 
 
The 2013 National Budget Speech was the first confirmation of the views of both SARS 
and NT. For the purposes of this study, these bodies will be referred to as regulatory 
bodies. It was from this point in time that future proposed measures of curbing the 
perceived tax avoidance were announced to be put in place. Following from this 
announcement, various measures were raised in the Davis Tax Committee Interim 
Reports on estate duty and the 2016 National Budget Speech which resulted in the 
introduction of s 7C into the Act. These proposed measures and the introduction of s 7C 
were aimed at curbing the avoidance of taxation and estate duty, respectively, through 
the use of trust structures. From all the proposed measures, s 7C is the only 
promulgated measure. 
 
Although it is aimed at preventing the perceived abuse of estate duty, based on the 
main reasons behind all the work conducted by the regulatory bodies, which was mainly 
around preventing the avoidance of tax and the insertion of this section in the Act both 
created an impression that s 7C was brought in to prevent the abuse of taxation in 
respect of trust structures. It goes without saying that anti-avoidance of estate duty 
should be and is best addressed in the estate duty Act. Using the Act to address this 
avoidance is questionable and results in confusion in respect of the intention of this 
section. As such, it could be argued on strong grounds that s 7C was brought in to 
prevent the avoidance of taxation.  
 
With this in mind, it is yet to be determined as to whether the provisions of this section 
achieved the goal of the regulatory bodies in curbing the avoidance of taxation. 
 
This study will interrogate the introduction of this section with the aim of concluding on 
its effectiveness in achieving its set purpose. 
 
1.1 The attention afforded to trusts by the regulatory bodies 
 
In the recent past years, trusts have been afforded a considerable amount of attention 
by the regulatory bodies. This appears to have come about as SARS is under immense 
pressure to collect revenue from taxpayers and aligning itself with the principles of 
Base-Erosion and Profit-Shifting (‘BEPS’) measures. These measures directed the 
regulatory bodies back to the drawing table where investigations took place to identify 
and prevent structures where potential tax avoidance existed. As such, trust structures 
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were identified as one of the pertinent areas to focus on as there is tax avoidance. This 
is however uncorroborated. 
 
Due to the intensity of the regulatory bodies to prevent the perceived abuse and due to 
the failure by these regulatory bodies to substantiate their perceived view of tax 
avoidance (or estate duty avoidance), taxpayers undertook to identify the reasons for 
the view of abuse, either in respect of taxation or estate duty. 
 
As such, taxpayers investigated the reasons for trust creations in order to determine 
whether trusts are indeed created for an avoidance of taxation. Furthermore, taxpayers 
conducted calculations in order to have a demonstration of the avoidance of tax through 
the use of trusts. 
 
The outcome of the above is that most and if not all trusts are created for purposes of 
estate planning, specifically for asset protection. This resulted in a concern by the 
industry that the regulatory bodies have not conducted the required homework on which 
to base their view. It is therefore questioned that if trusts are created for asset protection 
purposes, what then justifies the view that there is tax avoidance through these 
structures? 
 
In looking at this factor from a different angle, industry role players in the Tax fraternity 
conducted calculations with the aim of proving that SARS is indeed losing out on the 
collection of taxes due to trusts structures and thereby seeking to prove the perceived 
analogy of the avoidance of tax by SARS. It was found in these calculations that there is 
a tax event when an asset is placed in the trust, whilst the asset is sitting in the trust and 
on the growth of that asset, upon disposal or death of the donor or dissolution of a trust. 
The calculations proved that SARS collects more tax than loses out, through the use of 
trust structures.  
 
Though this fact was communicated to SARS, this did not deter the regulatory bodies 
from persisting with the work of curbing the unsubstantiated, perceived tax avoidance. 
Perhaps this could be due to the fact that the industry’s corroborated results were not in 
line with those utilised by the regulatory bodies to substantiate the abuse. Although a 
taxpayer uses a vehicle for the right reasons, it does not necessarily mean that there is 
no tax avoidance, perhaps in the manner in which the current legislation is drafted or the 
lack of a required section in the Act, thereof. As such, it remains the business of the 
regulatory bodies to investigate such anomalies and provide amendments or introduce 
new sections in the Act in order to give effect to the South African tax legislation. 
 
Furthermore, although the calculations prove that SARS is not in effect losing out on 
revenue collection, it is important for taxpayers to differentiate between tax avoidance 
and loss to the fiscus in terms of revenue collections. These two aspects are different 
and although in some instances they may be linked, they should be addressed 
differently. It follows therefore that the regulatory bodies introduced s 7C to address tax 
avoidance and not necessarily the revenue loss to the fiscus. 
 
Following from this, trust structures commenced to obtain more attention from SARS 
and NT.  
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As mentioned, South Africans have always made use of trusts for estate planning 
purposes. However, it is viewed that some taxpayers used trust structures for tax 
planning purposes which resulted in tax avoidance. In other words, trust structures may 
have been used to either transport funds out of South Africa into a sham trust or South 
African resident taxpayers may have used a valid trust to transport funds out of South 
Africa with the aim of avoiding South African taxation. Furthermore, some funding 
mechanisms of a trust may be seen to avoid tax in that not all the tax that pertains to 
such mechanism is effectively collected. Further to this is the manner in which trusts are 
taxed in terms of South African tax regulation. 
 
Although trusts still remain a useful estate planning tool, especially for asset protection 
purposes, SARS and NT view these structures as an enabling tool to avoid taxation. As 
such, preventative measures were explored with the aim of curbing the tax abuse 
created by trusts. 
 
 
2. CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
2.1 Proposed measures undertaken to curb the avoidance of tax through the use 
of trusts 
 
Over the past years, various measures were proposed to be put in place for the 
avoidance of tax through trusts. 
 
2.1.1. The 2013 Budget Speech by the Minister of Finance 
 
The initial measure undertaken by SARS and NT was announced in the 2013 National 
Budget Speech. In his 2013 Budget Speech, the Minister of Finance announced that 
‘there will be measures to reform the taxation of trusts to curtail the avoidance of tax 
associated with trusts’. This announcement reaffirmed the views of the regulatory bodies 
in respect of trusts. Based on this announcement, it can be evidenced that the proposed 
measures, at the time, were not directed at the form or the structure of a trust as per the 
principles of common law. They were directed at the manner in which trusts are taxed. 
 
The form of a trust was introduced into the Cape Colony. Following from this point, the 
Courts of Common Law also defined and prescribed a trust form. A trust was defined in 
the Hague Convention as a legal relationship created during the lifetime of the donor or 
on death of the donor, where the donor places assets under the control of a trustee for 
the benefit of a beneficiary. 
 
The divesting of the ownership of assets from the donor to the trustees is a principle that 
is in line and is required by Roman-Dutch civil law. South Africa follows this civil law for 
trusts. The principles of Contract law are also used in South Africa in order to give effect 
to trust deeds. In essence, the trust form, although prescribed by various laws, has been 
accepted into South African law. 
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South African trust law is not cast in stone and as such, it remains a subject matter that 
is subject to various interpretations. However, it took a number of years for South Africa 
to conclude on a consistent interpretation of a trust form. As such, an amendment to the 
form of a trust would create major disruptions in the trust fraternity. 
 
The regulatory bodies were also mindful of the potential disruptions and such they did 
not propose a measure that would impact a trust form. The indicated measure was 
directed to the taxation of trusts. 
 
The South African tax law subjects persons, as defined in section 1 of the Act, to 
taxation. In order to provide clarity on the taxation of trusts, trusts were included in the 
definition of a “person” in the Act, in 1991. It was from this point that trusts, in their 
capacity as a person for tax purposes, were subject to taxation. 
 
The form of a trust and the manner in which income of a trust is handled may however 
result in peculiar taxing mechanisms. In other words, the tax implications of a trust are 
dependent on the source of its income and the distribution methods of a trust. This 
means that the income of a trust may be taxed either in the trust itself, the donor or the 
beneficiaries. This however depends on whether a trust is a discretionary or vested 
trust. The peculiarity arises in respect of discretionary trusts as in a vested trust, where 
the beneficiaries have full vested rights to both the income and capital of the trusts; the 
taxation implications follow the beneficiaries and not the trust. 
 
This taxing method stems from the principles of case law1 where it was held that a trust 
is a mere conduit pipe through which the income flows, and the income retains its 
identity in the hands of the beneficiaries. It is for this reason that various applicable 
provisions of the Act must always be consulted in identifying the taxpayer liable for tax 
on the income or capital of the trust. 
 
As mentioned above, the tax liability may be of the donor, beneficiaries or the trust. In 
identifying the applicable provisions, ss 7(2), (3), (4) and (8) of the Act must be used for 
purposes of the donor. Sections 25B and 7(1) are applicable to the beneficiaries and the 
trust is taxed where s 25B(1) applies.   
 
Currently, the highest income tax rate applicable to a trust and a natural person is 45%, 
as recently announced in the 2017 National Budget Speech. However, this rate is fixed 
for a trust (other than a special trust) and is flexible in respect of natural persons, 
depending on the applicable rate. The income tax rates for natural persons range from 
18% to 45%. In this respect, there is room for diversion of income into the hands of the 
person with the lowest income tax rate applicable to them. In other words, the trust may 
distribute all its income into the hands of a beneficiary who is taxed at 18% instead of 
holding the income in the trust and suffer tax at 45%.  
 
It can be evidenced from the above that there is flexibility in respect of the taxation of 
trusts.  
 
                                                          
1 Armstrong v CIR 1938 AD 343 10 SATC 1 
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Due to the fact that the perceived view of the regulatory bodies was not substantiated, a 
view could be developed that it is this flexibility that resulted in the announcement by the 
Minister of Finance to reform the taxation of trusts to curtail the avoidance of tax.  
  
There was no further elaboration on this announcement and as such the industry 
digested the views of these two regulatory bodies and yearned for further provision of 
details in this respect. 
 
In the same Budget Speech, the Minister further stated that discretionary trusts will no 
longer act as flow through vehicles. It is to this point that it could be concluded that the 
concerns of SARS and NT are in respect of discretionary trusts and the manner in which 
they are taxed in terms of South African tax principles. As discussed above, the concern 
in respect of these types of trusts is in respect of the flexibility of the taxation of these 
types of trusts and the fact that it is viewed that this flexibility results in the avoidance of 
taxation. This flexibility in relation to discretionary trusts resulted in the discomfort by the 
regulatory bodies and thereby resulted in a proposal to amend the current taxing 
methodology of discretionary trusts. 
 
The principles of case law2 were used as prescription in respect of the manner in which 
a trust is taxed. As such, these principles have been used and relied upon in South 
Africa for many decades. It was held in a case, that the income of a trust retains its 
nature only if it accrues to the beneficiaries in the same year of assessment as it 
accrued to the trust3. Any accumulated income in the trust would normally already have 
been taxed in the hands of the trust or donor (emphasis). 
 
It is therefore clear that a lot of historical effort contributed to the current tax laws. The 
doing away of the conduit pipe principle (also referred to as the flow through principle) 
endured major attack by the industry as it contradicts the characteristics of a trust. 
 
This announcement, in essence, was aimed at making the trust the only person that will 
be subject to taxation in respect of all the income and capital of the trust. This will mean 
that the tax implications arising as a result of the attribution and distribution principles of 
a trust will be done away with and the principles of the Armstrong and Rosen cases will 
no longer prevail. 
 
Due to potential disruptions that this would have caused and the attacks from the 
industry, there was no amendment to effect any of the above announcements in the 
Taxation Laws Amendment Bill of 2013 and 2014. However, the regulatory bodies did 
not halt their exertion on curbing the avoidance of tax through trusts. As such, a further 
mentioned by way of a recommendation was evidenced in the First Interim Report on 
Estate Duty, by the Davis Tax Committee.    
 
2.1.2. The 2015 Davis Tax Committee First Interim Report on estate duty 
 
                                                          
2 Armstrong v CIR 1938 AD 343 10 SATC 1 and SIR v Rosen 1971 (1) SA 173 (A), 32 SATC 249 
3 SIR v Rosen 1971 (1) SA 173 (A), 32 SATC 249 
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The Davis Tax Committee was established in 2013 and is chaired by Judge Dennis 
Davis. It was established with the objective to assess South Africa’s tax policy 
framework and its role is to support the objectives of inclusive growth, employment, 
development and fiscal sustainability. As part of its mandate in reviewing the South 
African tax policy, there was an immediate need by the Davis Tax Committee (‘DTC’) to 
address BEPS. A part of this involved an investigation of the avoidance of estate duty 
and tax through the use of trusts structures.  
 
In July 2015, the DTC released its first interim report on estate duty for public comment. 
It was recommended in this report that the “attribution principle” for trusts should be 
repealed. The attribution principle is in line with what is discussed above, where the 
income of a trust can be attributed back and be taxed in the hands of a donor. 
 
This recommendation was substantiated by the fact that the attribution principle is 
governed by the provisions of s 7 of the Act. Section 7 was originally intended as an 
anti-avoidance measure with the effect of preventing a trust from being used as an 
income-splitting vehicle. However, the attribution principle is currently used to avoid tax. 
This therefore defeats the intended purpose of this section. 
 
Further to this recommendation, the DTC alluded to a perceived donations tax 
avoidance whereby assets are transferred to a trust on loan account. The loan would be 
an interest-free loan and would be left to remain outstanding until the death of the donor. 
 
In this respect, the following recommendations, amongst others, were outlined in this 
first interim report: 
 
➢ The flat rate for trusts should be maintained at its existing levels and trusts 
should be taxed as separate taxpayers; 
➢ The deeming provisions of ss 7 and 25B should be repealed in respect of 
local trusts (and should remain in respect of offshore trusts; and 
➢ No attempt should be made to implement transfer pricing adjustments in the 
event of interest-free loans to trusts. 
 
Two themes, which are of great concern to the DTC, are evidenced in their 
recommendations. One being the avoidance of tax caused by the attribution principle 
and secondly, the avoidance of donations tax which results from advancing interest-free 
loans to a trust. 
 
The avoidance of tax due to the attribution principle is clearly the doing of the regulatory 
bodies as they drafted and promulgated ss 7 and 25. As discussed above, the drafting 
of these two sections were aligned to the principles of the Armstrong and Rosen cases. 
Although amendments to constantly curb tax avoidance are necessary, it is prejudicial to 
resort to doing away with what was their work (in drafting the legislation) purely because 
taxpayers use the provisions of these sections to their advantage. It is observed that the 
regulatory bodies are failing to acknowledge the extensive effort that was afforded in 
deriving the current taxation principles of trusts and to erase this from the taxing 
principles without an alternative workable solution is not an answer.  
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It goes without saying that this recommendation was condemned by the industry to its 
demise. As a result, there was no further mention of this recommendation or its 
execution. 
 
The report of the DTC alluded to what can be viewed as the second theme of concerns, 
being the curtailing of the use of interest-free loans to avoid donations taxation. 
 
The taxation of donations is outlined in s 54 of the Act. It is defined therein that a 
donation is any gratuitous disposal of property including any gratuitous waiver or 
renunciation of a right. The question that arises is whether an outright advancement of 
an interest-free loan is a donation? In other words, would the forgone interest constitute 
a donation to the trust? 
 
A loan that is outright stipulated as an interest-free loan could mean that the lender 
gratuitously waivers any right to interest on the loan. Based on this, it could therefore be 
the view that an interest-free loan results in the donation of the forgone interest. In this 
case then, why is there a need for recommendations by the DTC and further work by the 
regulatory bodies on interest-free loans as the forgone interest is clearly a donation that 
is subject to the provisions of s54? 
 
It follows however, that a donation that is a donatio mortis causa and a donation that is 
in pursuance of a trust are exempt from donations tax. With this in mind, it appears that, 
although interest-free loans seemingly result in a donation of the forgone interest, these 
exemptions may apply to an interest-free loan. This however depends on the 
circumstances around the advancing of the loan. 
 
A donation that is a donatio mortis causa is a donation that takes place and is effected 
upon the death of the donor (or when the donor contemplates his death). An interest-
free loan is ordinarily advanced and is effective in the hands of the trust whilst the donor 
is alive (and not necessarily when he anticipates his death). In this case, it cannot be 
said that the interest-free element of the loan only kicks in upon death as this element is 
effective concurrently with the advancing of the loan. In this respect, this exemption is 
not applicable in respect of the ordinary interest-free loans advanced to trusts by 
lenders. 
 
Furthermore, a loan that is advanced in pursuance of a trust is also exempt from 
donations tax. There are differing industry views in respect of the interpretation of this 
exemption however. This is mainly in respect of the term “in pursuance”. In pursuance of 
a trust could mean in relation to a trust (on an ongoing basis) or the initial funding of a 
trust (applying only in respect of the first interest-free loan to a trust). 
 
The dictionary meaning of this word/ term is ‘carrying out’. Carrying out a trust could be 
seen to be a once off or a continuous act, hence the differing views. 
 
A different view has been alluded to this exemption, to the effect that this exemption 
relates to a distribution by a trust to the beneficiaries of the trust and further reaffirms 
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that donations to a trust are subject to donations tax4. In applying this interpretation, it 
follows therefore that all donations to a trust, including interest forgone as a result of 
interest-free loans are subject to donations tax as the exemption does not apply. 
 
On a different angle however, it is not mandatory to charge interest on a loan. This is 
evidenced in case law5. As such, it cannot necessarily be concluded that an interest-free 
loan results in a gratuitous act. Charging of interest is optional and the advancing of an 
interest-free loan does not meet the requirements of s 54. As such, interest-free loans 
are not donations as per s 54 of the Act. However, interest-free loans can be viewed as 
a disposition and be treated as a deemed donation in terms of the provisions of s 7. This 
then justifies the need for further work by the regulatory bodies as there may be a view 
of a loophole in respect of the levying of donations tax on interest-free loans.    
 
Seeing that forgone interest constitutes a deemed donation and is subjected to the 
provisions of s 7, it is further questioned as to why are the regulatory bodies and the 
DTC are still of the view that this type of funding mechanism results in the avoidance of 
tax? This is due to the fact that this funding mechanism is already addressed in the 
provisions of s7. 
 
As elaborated above and previously stated above, the view of the regulatory bodies is 
unsubstantiated. They nevertheless continued with further proposals in respect of this 
view.     
 
2.1.3. The 2016 National Budget Speech by the Minister of Finance 
 
The Minister of Finance continued with the measures in respect of trusts in his 2016 
Budget Speech where he announced that assets transferred through a loan to a trust 
are to be included in the estate of the founder at death. This announcement was 
directed at the limiting of the avoidance of estate duty and not so much taxation. 
Perhaps this may be viewed as an acknowledgement by the regulatory bodies that 
interest-free loans result in the avoidance of estate duty and not taxation.  
 
The Minister further announced that they will categorise interest-free loans to a trust as 
donations, thereby triggering donations tax. This focus by the Minister, on interest-free 
loans is consistent with the concern raised by the DTC whereby it is clearly concluded 
that taxpayers are avoiding donations tax through the use of interest-free loans. 
 
As discussed above, the forgone interest in relation to an interest-free loan meets the 
definition of a deemed donation in terms of the provisions of s 7 and should already be 
subject to the taxing provisions of s7. 
 
This consistent view by all these bodies could mean that –  
 
                                                          
4 Silke: South African Income Tax, Volume 2: 2017, 816 
5 C: SARS v Brummeria Renaissance (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 601 (SCA), 69 SATC 205 (SCA), [2007] 4 
All SA 1338 (SCA), (2007) 69 SATC 205 
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➢ The regulatory bodies acknowledge the flaws in respect of the interpretation 
of a donation/ deemed donation, whereby there could be room for taxpayers 
to argue out of a donation in respect of the forgone interest as a result of an 
interest-free loan; or 
 
➢ The regulatory bodies acknowledge the flaws in respect of the interpretation 
of the exemptions from donations tax in respect of trusts in s 56, specifically 
in relation to a pursuance of a trust, whereby taxpayers may interpret the 
exemption to apply to any donation to a trust thereby nullifying the 
applicability of ss 54 and 7 to donations made to trust. This would result in the 
avoidance of donations tax in respect of interest-free loans to trusts; or 
 
➢ The regulatory bodies, although the Act provides for anti-avoidance measures 
in respect of interest-free loans to trusts, have failed to effectively monitor the 
non-compliance with respect to the applicable provisions of the Act. As a 
result, they embark on a complete new regulation which they perhaps will be 
able to effectively administer and monitor.  
 
Announcements in the Budget Speech are not legislation unless gazetted into law and 
the public awaited a legislative amendment or addition which will enforce the measures 
proposed by the regulatory bodies and the DTC. As such, the draft Tax Laws 
Amendment Bill which was released in July 2016 contained an insertion of a new 
proposed section aimed at interest-free loans to trusts, namely s7C. 
 
2.1.4. The proposed new section 7C inserted in the Tax Laws Amendment Bill, 
released July 2016  
 
As awaited for by the public, the new proposed s 7C was inserted into the draft Tax 
Laws Amendment Bill (‘the Bill’) in July 2016 for public commentary. 
 
When initially brought into the Bill, s 7C was aimed at interest-free loans or low interest 
loans to trusts by connected persons whereby the forgone interest was to result in gross 
income in the hands of the lender. This, at the time, created an impression that s 7C 
was brought in to curb the avoidance of tax avoidance as the tax implications on the 
forgone interest constituted income tax instead of estate duty. 
 
There were no exemptions provided for in this initial draft legislation. As a result, an 
impression was created that all trusts, of any type and any residency, were impacted by 
s 7C. In other words, it appeared that local and offshore trusts and vesting and 
discretionary trusts were all impacted by s 7C. 
 
As expected, this was not welcomed by the industry and as such, various industry 
bodies within the Tax fraternity partook in discussions with the regulatory bodies. 
Following from the discussions and comments submitted by the public, the second draft 
of this legislation was released in September 2016. 
 
The nature of the forgone interest was amended from gross income to a donation, 
thereby subjecting the forgone interest to donations tax in the hands of the lender. 
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Although this was in line with the recommendations by the DTC and the National Budget 
Speech, it confirms an element of confusion by the regulatory bodies in respect of 
whether s 7C is aimed at the avoidance of tax or estate duty. This also confirmed some, 
if not all the views outlined in the bullet points above. 
  
Furthermore, the second draft introduced a list of exemptions from the ambit of s 7C. 
Most of the exemptions were highly welcomed by the public. Some exemptions, 
although they were welcomed by the public, they either create interpretation issues or 
leave taxpayers with more questions than answers. These will be discussed in the study 
below. 
 
Nevertheless, this section was promulgated into law in January 2017 and is effective 
from 1 March 2017.  
 
2.2 Introduction of section 7C 
 
SARS and NT succeeded their attention on trusts with an addition into the tax 
legislation. The new s 7C was promulgated in January 2017 and is effective from 1 
March 2017. This section applies to loans entered into from 1 March 2017 and also 
applies to loans entered into prior to 1 March 2017 that are still in existence on 1 March 
2017.  
 
However, this section is aimed at only one type of funding mechanism in respect of 
trusts and does not expand to other ways in which trusts are funded. Section 7C 
focuses only on interest-free or low interest loans granted to trusts and looks to curb the 
estate duty avoidance resulting from this funding mechanism. In effect, s 7C deems the 
forgone interest resulting from interest-free or low interest loans to be a donation in the 
hands of the lender. 
 
Although loans are a popular manner of funding trusts, there are other mechanisms 
which are used to fund trusts, namely by way of an outright donation, sale of assets to 
trusts or bequeath of assets by the lender/ donor. Bearing this in mind, it remains an 
unanswered question as to the reason for the introduction of this section. It may be that, 
although there are other funding mechanisms which the Act already addresses in terms 
of their tax implications, interest-free or low interest loans remained the only funding 
mechanism which was yet to be addressed by the Act, perhaps from an estate duty 
point of view. 
 
In so saying, it further remains questionable as to whether this section achieves its goal 
as envisaged by both SARS and NT. 
 
 
3. CHAPTER 2 – THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 7C AND ITS 
REQUIREMENTS 
 
Section 7C relates to loans or credit advanced to a trust by a connected person. For the 
purposes of this study, loans and credit will be collectively referred to as loans. 
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This section applies where the loan is provided by a natural person or at the instance of 
that person, a company in relation to which that person is a connected person. The 
connectivity in respect of a loan advanced by a company, is applicable only where the 
person, other than a company, individually or jointly with any other connected person/s 
in relation to that person, holds, directly or indirectly, at least 20 per cent of the equity 
shares in the company or the voting rights in the company. 
 
In other words, the loan must be provided by a natural person or a company wherein the 
person granting the loan holds 20 per cent or more of the equity or voting rights. Where 
this is the case, the applicability of s 7C must be considered. 
 
The loan can be provided either directly or indirectly by the natural person or company. 
The natural person and the company must be connected persons in relation to the trust 
to which the loan was provided. 
 
It must be noted that the connected person test is also extended to any other person 
who is a connected person in relation to the natural person or the company. In other 
words, s 7C may apply in the following instances –  
 
➢ Where a connected natural person provides a loan, directly or indirectly to a 
trust;  
➢ Where a company, at the instance of that person, provides a loan, directly or 
indirectly to a trust. Such person must hold at least 20 per cent voting or equity 
rights in that company; 
➢ Where a connected person in relation to the natural person (in bullet point one), 
directly or indirectly provides a loan to a trust; or  
➢ Where a connected person to a person who holds at least 20 per cent in a 
company, directly or indirectly provides a loan to a trust. 
 
Lenders who will be considered for s 7C in relation to a natural person -   
 
In relation to a natural person, a beneficiary of a trust is a connected person in relation 
to a trust. Meaning that should a beneficiary directly or indirectly grant a loan to a trust, 
the applicability of s 7C must be considered. Furthermore, any connected person in 
relation to a beneficiary of a trust is also a connected person in relation to the trust. It is 
this extension in respect of connected persons that catches most, if not all, loans to a 
trust in respect of natural persons, for purposes of s 7C. 
 
In most cases as evidenced in the practical world, a loan to a trust is ordinarily granted 
by the donor. Although the donor may not be the beneficiary of the trust, he is in most 
instances a connected person in relation to the beneficiary of the trust and as such, 
these types of loans are in scope for consideration of the applicability of s 7C. If the 
donor and the beneficiary are relatives6 as defined in the Act, they are connected 
                                                          
6 A relative in relation to any person is defined as the spouse of such person or anybody related to 
him or his spouse within the third degree of consanguinity, or any spouse of anybody so related. For 
the purpose of determining the relationship between any child referred to in the definition of ‘child’, 
such child shall be deemed to be related to its adoptive parent within the first degree of consanguinity.  
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persons in relation to each other and consequently, this makes both of them connected 
persons in relation to the trust. 
 
For example, a father creates a trust and his child is a beneficiary of such trust. A loan 
granted by the father as the donor and not the beneficiary must be considered for s 7C 
as the father and child are connected persons in relation to the trust. 
 
It is a general view that the public has been deterred from trust structures purely due to 
the introduction of s 7C. However, the applicability thereof is not always considered 
upfront. Therefore, care must always be taken in determining the applicability of s 7C in 
respect of natural persons 
 
Lenders who will be considered for s 7C in relation to a company –  
 
The requirement in respect of a company is a direct or indirect shareholding (of either 
equity or voting rights), individually or jointly with any connected person in relation to 
each other, of 20 per cent or more in a company. Therefore, where the shareholding is 
less than 20 per cent, the loans from the company to the trust are not impacted by the 
provisions s 7C. No tangible reason for this was provided by the regulatory bodies. 
 
This requirement for a minimum shareholding leaves room for the avoidance of s 7C 
through the use of interposing companies where there is less than 20 per cent 
shareholding. The regulatory bodies have awaken to this gap and as alluded to in the 
2017 National Budget Speech, there may be an amendment in future to include all 
companies where there is shareholding of any percentage, instead of the minimum 
requirement of 20 per cent. This will be discussed further in the study below. 
 
Section 7C states that where the trust incurs no interest on the loan provided or incurs 
interest at a lower rate than the official rate of interest as defined in paragraph 1 of the 
Seventh Schedule, the interest forgone will constitute a donation by the lender to the 
trust. The official rate is currently 8 per cent, being the South African repo rate plus one 
per cent. This means that the official rate of 8 per cent is not fixed but will fluctuate as 
the repo rate fluctuates. 
 
In a situation where the loan is provided by a company to a trust, each shareholder in 
that company will be treated as having donated to that trust, a part of the loan amount 
that bears to the total loan amount the same ratio as the equity shares or voting rights in 
that company were held by that person during that year of assessment bears to the 
equity shares or voting rights in that company held in aggregate by those persons during 
the year of assessment. 
 
For example, a company that has 5 shareholders each with 20 per cent shareholding of 
equity shares, grants an interest-free loan of R10 000 000 to a trust. Each of the 
shareholders will be treated as having provided an interest-free loan of R2 000 000 to 
the trust. The forgone interest of R160 000 (R2 000 000 * 8%) will be deemed to be a 
donation from each of the shareholders to the trust. Where applicable, the annual 
exemption of R100 000 on donations may be used.  
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Subsection 5 of s 7C lists all the exemptions from s 7C as follows: 
 
➢ A public benefit organisation approved by the Commissioner in terms of s 30(3) 
of the Act or a small business funding entity approved by the Commissioner in 
terms of s 30C of the Act; 
➢ A fully vested trust where all the beneficiaries have a vested right to both the 
capital and income of the trust; 
➢ A special trust created solely for the benefit of one or more persons who is or are 
persons with a disability. This exemption does not extend to a special trust 
created for minor children; 
➢ A loan partly or wholly used by the trust for the acquisition of a primary residence 
and the primary residence was used by the lender or his spouse as a primary 
residence as contemplated in paragraph (b) of the definition of “primary 
residence” in paragraph 44 of the Eighth Schedule to the Act; 
➢ A loan that constitutes an affected transaction as defined in s 31(1) of the Act; 
➢ A loan advanced to a trust in terms of sharia complaint financing arrangements 
as per s 24JA of the Act, had that trust been a bank as defined in that section; or 
➢ A loan that is subject to the provisions of s 64E(4). 
 
Some of these exemptions will be discussed in detail in the chapters that follow, in order 
to highlight the impracticalities thereby caused. 
 
The above outline of the provisions of s 7C only discusses aspects of this legislation that 
are relevant to the study at hand. It must be noted that the legislation consists of other 
provisions which, due to their irrelevance to the study, have not been outlined and 
discussed above.  
 
 
4. CHAPTER 3 – THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF S 7C AND ITS 
INTERPLAY WITH OTHER SECTIONS OF THE ACT THAT ARE AIMED AT 
TRUSTS 
 
As outlined above, to a naked eye, the provisions of s 7C may appear easy to apply. 
However, various impracticalities were foreseen by the tax industry. 
 
The section requires there to be an advancement of a loan. However, a loan or credit 
has not been defined in the Act. This therefore leaves room for different interpretations 
by taxpayers. For instance, is a loan or credit only a written agreement between two or 
more parties or does it also include a verbal agreement between parties? 
 
With the absence of a definition in the Act, one may resort to definitions provided in the 
dictionaries. A loan is defined in multiple dictionaries as –  
 
“A thing that is borrowed, especially a sum of money that is expected to be paid with 
interest”; or 
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“A loan is the act of giving money, property or other material goods to another party in 
exchange for future repayment of the principal amount along with interest or other 
finance charges”; or  
 
“A loan is a written or oral agreement for a temporary transfer of a property (usually 
cash) from its owner (the lender) to a borrower who promises to return it according to 
the terms of the agreement, usually with interest for its use. If the loan is repayable on 
the demand of the lender, it is called a demand loan” 
 
In applying the above definitions to s 7C, it can be seen that a loan is an act of lending 
money to a borrower for a return of future payments and expected interest payments 
(emphasis). It is evident from this that future repayments towards a loan are expected to 
be accompanied by interest charges. However, an expectation of something is merely 
an anticipation and not necessarily mandatory. It follows therefore that there is no 
mandatory requirement for interest to be charged on a loan. In the context of s 7C 
however, a question is posed as to why the regulatory bodies want to make it mandatory 
to charge interest on a loan and where it is not charged, they seek to punish the lender? 
 
It was held in case law7 that an amount must be placed for the gratuitous element 
arising from a loan being interest-free. Failure to execute this, resulted in a deemed 
donation in terms of the provisions of s 7. 
 
Although the definition of a loan implies that charging of interest is not mandatory, it 
makes financial sense and has thus become industry practice within the financial 
services companies to charge interest on loans. As such, it is normal practice for 
interest to be charged on a loan. As such, this practice resulted in an arms’ length8 
practise in respect of loan transactions. The Act also goes further to require connected 
parties to transact on an arms’ length basis amongst themselves, meaning that interest 
must be charged on loan transactions between connected persons. 
 
Although dictionaries and the principles of the Brummeria case can be consulted in 
identifying a loan, an unanswered question arises in respect of trust distributions to 
beneficiaries that are not taken by the beneficiaries. In other words, where a trust 
distributes income to a beneficiary and that beneficiary decides to not take possession 
of that distribution but leave it in the trust. In this case, is that amount (not taken by the 
beneficiary) seen as a loan by the beneficiary to the trust, where interest must then be 
charged? 
 
In this case and with reference to the definitions above, this is arguably an act of giving 
money back to the trust and perhaps with the expectation of future repayment of that 
money, either in instalments or as a once off payment. In this regard, there are various 
elements that must be addressed in order to determine whether there is a loan or not. It 
must first be ascertained as to whether there was an agreement, whether verbal or 
written, between the trust and the beneficiary to enter into a loan arrangement. It must 
                                                          
7 C: SARS v Renaissance (Pty) Ltd 2007 (6) SA 601 (SCA), 69 SATC 205 (SCA), 2007 4 All SA 1338 
(SCA), 2007 69 SATC 205 
8 Arms’ length is an acceptable price between a knowledgeable buyer and a willing seller. 
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further be determined whether the distribution was donated or loaned to the trust, 
wherein the beneficiary no longer has rights or a claim towards the distribution or a 
future repayment of the distribution by the beneficiary exists, respectively, with the latter 
resulting in a loan arrangement. 
 
It appears that the industry concerns in respect of a definition of a loan are not 
substantiated and it can be concluded that s 7C does not result in a predicament in this 
respect. It remains the taxpayer’s responsibility to prove that a loan arrangement was 
indeed entered into or not. 
 
Section 7C provides a list of exemptions. In terms of this list, a loan used for the 
acquisition of a primary residence is exempted from the ambit of s 7C. This exemption, 
amongst others, was highly welcomed by the industry as it targeted trusts which were 
created solely for the protection of primary residences. In essence, there should not be 
an avoidance of tax through funding such trusts as these trusts would ideally have been 
created solely for asset protection. An example of this is in respect of partners in a 
partnership, i.e. partners in some audit firms. Should there be a lawsuit in respect of the 
partnership business, their primary residences may be attached to the lawsuit. A trust is 
therefore created to house and thereby protect their primary residences. 
 
Although welcomed, this exemption is either unclear or incomplete and may also result 
in incorrect interpretation. 
 
It is stated in s 7C that this exemption is applicable where the loan was used for 
purposes of funding the acquisition of a primary residence (emphasis). The question 
that arises in respect of this exemption is what about primary residences that were 
constructed? Would loans used for the construction of a primary residence be exempt 
from s 7C or not? In principle, there should be no difference between a primary 
residence that is constructed or acquired.  
 
The definition of base cost in the Eighth Schedule to the Act includes cost of 
acquisitions and construction as part of a base cost for an asset. This makes sense in 
that an acquisition or construction both achieve the same purpose and for tax purposes, 
they should be treated the same. 
 
Based on this, some taxpayers may seek to apply this principle to the exemption in s 
7C. This may however be in contradiction of s 7C as the section only makes reference 
to an acquisition. The lack of clarity of intention in this respect will result in different 
interpretations and application of this exemption. This may result in penalties and 
interest for taxpayers should SARS not interpret or apply the exemption in their favour. 
 
Furthermore, it is not clear whether renovations and major structural improvements or 
repairs to the primary residence will form part of this exemption. It is yet again left to the 
taxpayer to decide whether or not a loan used for renovations, improvements or repairs 
to a primary residence is subject to the provisions of s 7C or not. 
 
The primary residence carve out appears to be simple yet it causes endless problems 
for taxpayers. 
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Furthermore, it is required that the primary residence must be used as such, for the full 
tax year. This means that in the year of acquisition and the year of sale of such primary 
residence, one will have to pay the donations tax unless the acquisition or disposal of 
the primary residence is timed for the beginning of the year of assessment. This is 
however extremely impractical, especially when dealing with sales and acquisitions of 
property. 
 
Section 7C further exempts Sharia compliant transactions from the ambit of s 7C. There 
are two issues that arise in this regard. One is the bad drafting of this exemption 
whereby it is required that the trust must have been a bank as defined. Sharia complaint 
transactions are ordinarily between a bank or a financier and a client of that bank. In 
practice, it has never been evidenced where the transaction is between a bank and a 
bank, where the second bank is a trust or has it been evidenced where the transaction 
is between a bank and a client, where the bank is a trust. This requirement of the 
exemption seems nonsensical as it cannot be applied in practice. It may be due to 
drafting error. 
 
Additionally, on the assumption that this exemption can be applied practically, it results 
in a very sensitive constitutional issue. The question that arises in respect of this 
exemption is why are Sharia compliant financing arrangements exempt from s 7C? It 
cannot possibly be because interest is not charged in terms of Sharia law.  
 
It must be noted that s 24JA of the Act discusses Sharia complaint financing 
arrangements and it is alluded therein that although interest is not charged from these 
arrangements, the margin resulting from these arrangements will be deemed to be 
interest in terms of s 24J of the Act. If this is the case, why is consistency not passed 
onto s 7C? Surely a financing arrangement in terms of Sharia law that is not between 
connected parties will seek to derive a margin. Same as a loan to a trust in terms of 
Sharia law will derive a margin on the right of use of money by the borrower. It is the 
view that the principle as per s 24JA, where the margin is deemed to be interest income, 
should be carried to Sharia compliant arrangements and the arm’s length principle 
should also be required in respect of these transactions. Failure to do so should result in 
discrimination based on religious belief. This is basically a constitutional matter that 
must either be substantiated or amended. 
 
The above issues may be due to bad drafting of the legislation and as such there may 
be future amendments to provide the required clarity. However, one exemption which is 
clear and direct in its drafting is the exemption in respect of affected transactions. 
Although the inclusion of this exemption does not create issues in respect of bad 
drafting, it still results in issues for taxpayers.   
 
4.1 The interplay between ss 7C and 31 
 
It is listed as one of the exemptions from s 7C that a loan that constitutes an affected 
transaction as defined in s 31(1) and is subject to the provisions of that section, is 
exempt from the ambit of s 7C. 
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An “affected transaction” is defined in s 31 of the Act as, amongst others, any 
transaction where that transaction has been directly or indirectly entered into between or 
for the benefit of a person that is a resident and any other person that is not a resident 
and those persons are connected persons in relation to one another and the terms of 
the transaction is different from any term that would have existed had those persons 
been independent persons dealing at arm’s length. 
 
In essence, an affected transaction is one that takes place between a resident and a 
non-resident who are connected persons and the transaction is not at arm’s length. The 
definitions of arm’s length and connected person in relation to a trust have been 
provided above. 
 
The above means that a loan from a lender to a trust, where the trust and the lender are 
connected persons and one is resident and the other is not a resident of South Africa 
and the terms of the loan agreement are not at arm’s length may be exempt from s 7C. 
 
In South Africa, a relationship that results in an affected transaction has mostly been 
evidenced where a South African resident donor advances an interest-free loan to his 
offshore trust9.  
 
The cross-examination of this exemption commences with the question as to whether a 
blanket view can be applied to the effect that all offshore trusts are exempt from the 
ambit of s 7C. This though, does not appear to be the intention of the regulatory bodies. 
If it were the case, the exemption would have directly stipulated that offshore trusts are 
exempted from s 7C. With this in mind, the intention of the regulatory bodies must be 
interrogated to ensure a clear understanding and accurate application of this exemption. 
 
It follows from the above that there must first be an affected transaction and secondly, 
the provisions of s 31 of the Act must apply to that affected transaction before an 
offshore trust can be said to be exempt from the ambit of s 7C. In other words, where an 
interest-free or low interest loan is provided by a connected resident to a connected 
offshore trust and the provisions of s 31 apply to that loan, s 7C will not apply. 
 
The above basically means that once it is determined that there is an affected 
transaction there must be a tax benefit10 as a result of such affected transaction. In this 
respect, the provisions of s 7C will not be applicable and the provisions of s 31 will 
apply. In this case, a primary and where applicable, a secondary adjustment will be 
made by the taxpayer in his/her taxable income to account for the amount of the 
deemed foreign interest at an arm’s length rate and where applicable, the donations tax 
for the relevant year of assessment, respectively.  
 
There are views in the industry to the effect that if loans that are subject to s 31 are 
exempt from s 7C,can the 8% official interest rate as required by s 7C be used as a 
guideline for an arm’s length rate in respect of loans to offshore trusts? This is due to 
                                                          
9 An offshore trust is one that is incorporated, established or formed in the Republic or which has its 
place of effective management in the Republic. 
10 Tax benefit includes any avoidance, postponement or reduction of any liability for tax. 
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the fact that the industry at large has been seeking guidance in respect of determining a 
market related interest rate in respect of loans to offshore trusts. 
 
In this respect, it has been viewed by the industry that perhaps the interplay of s 31 and 
s 7C implies that an interest rate of 8% may also be accepted in the context of affected 
transactions. 
 
The view of this study is that there is no ambiguity or issues in respect of the interplay of 
these two sections. The intention of the regulatory bodies is very clear in that where one 
section applies, the other does not apply. Furthermore, there is nowhere in s 7C or s 31 
stating that the acceptable interest rate for affected transactions is implied to be 8%. 
 
It follows therefore that the two sections need to be separated and so should the 
acceptable interest rates in respect of these sections of the Act. In determining the 
market related interest rates in respect of loans to offshore trusts, the provisions in the 
Seventh Schedule to the Act, amongst others, must be considered. Furthermore, all 
circumstances of the case at hand must be taken into account. This may include the 
following factors: 
 
➢ The nature and purpose of the loan; 
➢ The market conditions at the time the loan is granted; 
➢ The principal amount, duration and terms of the loan; 
➢ The currency in which the loan is denominated; 
➢ The exchange risks borne by the lender or borrower; 
➢ The security offered by the borrower; 
➢ The guarantees involved in the loan; 
➢ The credit standing of the borrower; and 
➢ The interest rate prevailing at the time of the arrangement. 
 
In practice, the taxpayer needs to be able to substantiate the arm’s length interest rate 
in respect of the loan to the trust and due to the perceived difficulty around this 
taxpayers are, without valid reasons, indicating that s 7C results in a problem where s 
31 is concerned. This is not the case, and it is concluded herein that the regulatory 
bodies have succeeded with the drafting of s 7C, where s 31 is concerned. 
 
However, the examinations of the exemptions in s 7C make no mention of the interplay 
of this section and the provisions of s 7. This means that both ss 7 and 7C may apply in 
respect of the same loan.     
   
4.2 The interplay of ss 7C and 7 
 
Section 7 is very wide in its application to donations, settlements and other dispositions. 
However, the provisions of this section have been used for both local and offshore trusts. 
The specific sections relevant in respect of donations, settlements and other dispositions 
applicable to trusts are ss 7(2), 7(3), 7(4) and 7(8). Section 7(8) is specifically applicable 
in the context of an offshore trust whilst the other sections are applicable in respect of 
local trusts. 
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It is stated in s 7(8) that, amongst others, ‘where by reason of or in consequence of any 
donation, settlement or other disposition made by a resident, any amount is received by 
or accrued to any person who is not a resident, which would have constituted income 
had that person been a resident, there shall be included in the income of that resident so 
much of that amount as is attributable to that donation, settlement or other disposition’. 
 
On the other hand, the provisions of ss 7(2), 7(3) and 7(4) all allude to donations, 
settlements and other dispositions between married persons and to children. However, 
there is no mention of the residency in this respect. Although this is the case, it is 
industry practice for these provisions to be applied in respect of local trusts as s 7(8) is 
specific to an offshore trust context. 
 
In essence, the above provisions, popularly referred to as the ‘donor attribution rules’ 
indicate that where an interest-free loan or low interest rate loan is advanced to either an 
offshore trust or local trust, the interest that is not charged on the loan by the lender 
constitutes a disposition to the trust thereby triggering the applicable provisions of s 7. In 
essence, the income received or accruing to the trust in relation to that forgone interest is 
deemed to be income in the hands of the donor. Where these rules apply, the South 
African resident must include in his/her gross income the amount of income attributable 
to him/ her as the lender and may claim a pro rata deduction for allowable expenditure of 
the trust in respect of the forgone interest.  
 
The effect of the provisions of s 7 is that of a deemed donation and tax implications arise 
in the hands of the donor in this respect. 
 
The South African resident is obliged to disclose any donation, settlement or other 
disposition in writing when submitting his/her tax return for the relevant tax year in which 
the donation, settlement or other disposition was made.  
 
Where an amount of income is attributable to a donation, settlement or other disposition, 
then the total amount of income which can be attributed to the resident donor is limited to 
the amount of the benefit derived by the trust from that donation, settlement or other 
disposition, being the benefit derived from the forgone interest. The donor will be subject 
to tax on the attributed income. 
 
As stated above that the income of a trust may be taxed in the hands of the donor or the 
beneficiaries, the attribution rules may result on double taxation especially in a case of a 
vested trust. In order to avoid double taxation that may be caused by the attribution to 
the donor and a distribution to a beneficiary, it is provided that to the extent that any 
income of the offshore trust that has been subject to tax in South Africa in the hands of 
the donor in respect of the donor attribution rules, such amount should not be taxable in 
the hands of any South African resident beneficiary if they are vested by the offshore 
trust in the South African tax resident beneficiary in a subsequent year of assessment. 
  
The provisions of s 7 have been in existence for a long period of time and their 
concurrent applicability with s 7C bring about two issues in respect of this study. The first 
issue is in respect of offshore trusts. The issue here is whether with the applicability of s 
7(8), would there still be a tax benefit as required by s 31? By applying the donor 
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attribution rules in terms of s 7(8), there should arguably be no tax benefit arising in 
respect of a loan to an offshore trust. If there is no longer a tax benefit due to the 
applicability of s 7(8), this would mean that s 31 is not applicable to the affected 
transaction. As such, the requirements of s 7C in respect of the exemption relating to 
affected transactions will not be met. Meaning that s 7C will then apply in this case. This 
ultimately results in both ss 7C and 7(8) applying to the same loan to an offshore trust. 
The question that arises is whether this concurrent application will not result in double 
taxation whereby s 7C taxes the donor on the donation arising from the interest forgone 
and s 7(8) taxes the donor on the deemed donation arising from the income of the trust 
derived from interest forgone? 
 
The second issue is in respect of the need of s 7C. If s 7(8) already caters for interest-
free or low interest rate loans in that there is an attribution back to the lender, why then 
was s 7C brought into law?  
 
Lastly and in respect of local trusts, would the concurrent application of the other 
provisions of ss 7 and 7C not result in double taxation also? If s 7 already caters for the 
deemed donation in respect of interest-free or loan interest loans for local trusts, why is 
there a need for s 7C?  
 
In addressing the above questions, the interactions between ss 7C, 7(8) and 31will be 
discussed. 
 
4.3 Interaction between the tax provisions (ss 31, 7C and 7) 
 
As stated above, the transfer pricing rules will apply where there is a loan to an offshore 
trust by a resident connected person which is not on an arm’s length basis and this 
results in a tax benefit (i.e. an affected transaction). The donor attribution rules apply to 
any loan by a resident where no interest is charged or where interest is charged at less 
than a market-related rate of interest, and these rules attribute the actual income earned 
(by consequence of the forgone interest) by the offshore/ local trust to the donor.  
 
Accordingly, below is a consideration of possible scenarios which may arise in the 
context of an interest-free loan made by a South African resident beneficiary to an 
offshore trust.  
 
Scenario: An interest-free loan of R1 million is advanced to an offshore trust. The trust’s 
income for the year of assessment is $2 million and it is assumed that $1 million of this 
amount was derived as a result of the forgone interest on the loan and the other $1 
million was derived as a result of the loan advanced. The donor attribution rule would 
apply to attribute $1 million of such income to the donor. It must be noted however that 
the maximum amount of income that may be attributed would be equal to the market-
related rate of interest which would have been payable on the capital amount of the loan, 
i.e. $2 million * a market related interest rate.  
 
In the scenario above, it is assumed that there is an affected transaction and a tax 
benefit is derived. As such, transfer pricing rules apply and s 7C is therefore not 
applicable. 
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As noted above, the donor attribution rules will seek to attribute to the donor the income 
amount equalling the market related rate of interest which would have been payable on 
the loan amount. This means that a market related interest rate must first be determined 
in order to apply the donor attribution rules. If the attribution of the trust’s income results 
in the taxable income of the donor being the same as it would have been had a primary 
adjustment been made under the transfer pricing rules, then there is no tax benefit and 
therefore there is no requirement for a primary adjustment. This means that the 
provisions of s 31 will not be applicable. 
 
However, if the taxable income of the donor after the attribution of the trust’s actual 
income is less than his/her taxable income would have been if a market-related rate of 
interest had been charged on the loan, that difference represents a tax benefit to the 
donor and the transfer pricing rules will apply.  
 
Where there is no income arising in the offshore trust in a particular tax year, there 
should be no attribution to the donor under the attribution rules. However, where the loan 
is interest-free or interest is charged at less than an arm’s length rate, the tax benefit for 
the donor will be the amount by which a market-related rate of interest exceeds the 
actual interest charged on the loan. The transfer pricing rules will apply to deem the 
donor to have earned a market-related rate of interest on the loan and the donor should 
make an adjustment to his/her taxable income to include an amount of deemed interest 
under the transfer pricing rules. In this case, the transfer pricing rules apply and s 7C will 
not be applicable.  
 
Although s 7C will not apply, both ss 7(8) and 31 will apply to the same loan. 
 
It is however acknowledged that the provisions of ss 31 and 7(8) are not new in any 
respect and have always been applicable. However, the above serves to emphasise the 
need for exemption of s 31 impacted loans from the ambit s 7C. This is due to the fact 
that adequate provisions in the Act have always been in existence in respect of such 
loans and therefore a further section, in the form of s 7C is not required in addition to the 
above. 
 
In addressing the issue in respect of the double taxation caused by the concurrent 
application of these sections, ss 31 and 7(8) are seen in the industry to apply to two 
different tax types and as such they should not result in double taxation. This study will 
not discuss this aspect and will instead focus on the interplay of ss 7 and 7C to 
determine whether there is any double taxation. 
 
To note from the above arguments however is that it may be concluded that the interplay 
of ss 7C and 31 do not result in double taxation and the applicable exemption of s 31 
from the ambit of s 7C was a well thought out aspect. Although the acceptability by 
SARS of the taxpayer’s market related interest rate is not as clearly stipulated, this issue 
has always been in existence and as such it is not a concern to be brought into s 7C. 
   
Below is a consideration of a possible scenario which may arise in the context of an 
interest-free loan made by a South African resident donor to a local trust. 
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Scenario: An interest-free loan of R1 million is advanced to a local trust. The trust’s 
income for the year of assessment is R2 million and it is assumed that R1 million of this 
amount was derived as a result of the forgone interest on the loan and the other R1 
million was derived as a result of the loan advanced. The donor attribution rule, as per s 
7, would apply to attribute R1 million of such income to the donor. It must be noted 
however that the maximum amount of income that may be attributed would be equal to 
the market-related rate of interest which would have been payable on the capital amount 
of the loan, i.e. R2 million * a market related interest rate.  
 
As noted above, the donor attribution rules will seek to attribute to the donor the income 
amount equalling the market related rate of interest which would have been payable on 
the loan amount. This means that a market related interest rate must first be determined 
in order to apply the donor attribution rules. 
 
Furthermore, since the loan advanced is an interest-free loan, the provisions of s 7C will 
also apply. This means that, over and above the donor attribution rules, a donation will 
be deemed to have been made by the donor to the trust. As such, donations tax at 20% 
will be payable to SARS by the donor. 
 
In this scenario, it is evidenced that the donor will be taxed on the income of the trust of 
R1 million (this is due to the fact that it was derived as a result of the interest-free 
element of the loan) as per the provisions of s 7 and at the same time, donations tax on 
the donation will be suffered as per the provisions of s 7C. In this respect, is this not 
double taxation on the same transaction, being the advancement of an interest-free 
loan? 
 
It is the view that there is actually no double taxation in that the taxation brought about by 
both ss 7 and 7C are aimed at two different income streams and hence result in two 
different tax types. Section 7 taxes the income derived from the loan whilst s 7C taxes 
the donation triggered by the act of advancing the loan (emphasis). In other words, one 
is an income tax and the other is estate duty, respectively. 
 
In this case then, it is concluded that there is no double income tax but then again there 
is double tax of some sort on the same loan transaction. 
 
The interplay of ss 7 and 7C in respect of local trusts however creates an element of 
double tax in some way or another. Although this double taxation results due to the 
application of two different tax types, the lender/ donor is still subjected to double tax 
somehow and this is as a result of the introduction of s 7C.  
 
Although relevant in respect of the taxation of trusts, s 25B has been excluded from the 
study due to its irrelevance to the subject matter of the study. 
 
5. CHAPTER 4 – OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO TAXPAYERS WITH THE 
INTRODUCTION OF SECTION 7C ON EXISTING LOANS AND NEW 
FUNDING TO TRUSTS 
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Section 7C has been highly topical, resulting in taxpayers questioning the future 
existence of trusts. However, is this section deserving of the attention and the panic that 
it has been provided? Taxpayers still have other options at their disposal in respect of 
funding a trust and it may be premature to use s 7C as the only role player in losing 
interest in the use of a trust structure for estate planning purposes.  
 
5.1 Options available to the lender in respect of existing loans 
 
Amongst others, lenders of existing loans can partake in the following options prior to the 
introduction of s 7C –  
 
➢ To either amend the existing loan agreement from e.g. interest-free to charging 
an interest rate of 8% per annum. In this case, the lender will incur tax (possibly 
at 45%) on the interest income earned from the trust. The trust may however 
deduct the interest expense for tax purposes, although this is questionable11. In 
this regard, the trust must be liquid enough to fund the interest of 8% annually. 
However, this is not a requirement of s 7C. In terms of s 7C, it is only required 
that the lender pay tax on the interest income, regardless of whether such income 
was received from the trust or not. 
 
This means that, in opting for this option, the lender must have funds to pay the 
required tax. 
 
In practice and in line with this option however, advisors in the industry have 
been advising lenders to ensure liquidity in the trust in order for the trust to be 
able to pay the lender. This will then enable the lender to be able to afford the tax 
on an annual basis. 
 
The issue with this however is that a lot of trusts are not liquid. They mainly hold 
investment assets or property and not necessarily cash deposits. This means 
that a trust in this situation will be forced into a situation to dispose all or some of 
its assets in order to raise funds for the lender to pay the donations tax. 
 
This is not at all feasible as the trust will now become of no use for its intended 
purpose being asset protection. There may no longer be any assets in the trust 
to justify asset protection and thereby risk its longevity. As such, there may 
therefore be no need for a trust purely due to the introduction of s 7C. 
 
This option appears to be impractical for taxpayers and may contribute to the 
dissolution of trusts. 
 
                                                          
11 The provisions of ss 11 and 23(g) must be met before the interest expense can be an allowable 
expense in the hands of the trust. It has been evidenced in practice that most loans are used to 
acquire investment assets which are held on a capital account. In this case, the deductibility of the 
interest expense is highly unlikely. 
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Furthermore, a sale by the trust of its assets will result in capital gains taxation 
(‘CGT’). This is a clear punishment to the taxpayer for attempting to comply with 
the requirements of the regulatory bodies. 
 
It is a double attack on a taxpayer which will result in a loss of interest in trust 
structures. This in effect will indirectly take away from the regulatory bodies as 
they will lose the future tax that would have been collected from trusts. 
 
➢ To do away with the loan account and have the trust pay back the outstanding 
capital. This depends on whether the trust has funds available to repay the loan 
or the trust may sell its assets to repay the loan. In this case again, CGT 
implications should yet again be observed in respect of this disposal. The use of 
a trust, after disposing assets it was meant to protect is also diminished. This is in 
line with the above point where the double attack will impact the interest in trust 
structures and thereby result in a decrease in the use of trusts followed by a 
consequential loss in future tax from trusts.  
 
Perhaps this is the goal of the regulatory bodies as there are industry views that 
there is a lack of full understanding of trust structures by the regulatory bodies 
and their basis of perceived tax avoidance is purely on the increased interest by 
the public in these structures. As such, in resolving their perceived abuse, they 
sort to eradicate the ‘cause’ of the problem, being trusts instead of introducing 
workable solutions. 
 
➢ Donate the outstanding loan capital to the trust, effectively doing away with the 
loan after paying donations tax of 20%. This appears to be one of the most 
practical options. The donor can outright pay the donations tax. This will do away 
with the perceived view that there is estate duty avoidance. Furthermore, the 
lender will enjoy the annual exemption of R100 000 from donations tax if no other 
donations were made in the same year of assessment. 
 
It follows however that, over and above the donations tax suffered, the lender 
suffers additional ongoing donor attribution implications on the interest-free 
element of the loan in terms of the provisions of s 7. 
 
With this in mind, it appears that there is no act that is good enough for the 
regulatory bodies as they will still apply more tax even after paying taxation. As 
discussed above, this may be accepted in that there are two different tax types 
applicable in this respect and the regulatory bodies by introducing s 7C are 
targeting the avoidance of estate duty, instead of income tax. 
 
It is also the view that when one opts for this option, it proves that the purpose of 
the trust was not to avoid taxation but for estate planning purposes. It is viewed 
that one should not be deterred from paying tax if the purpose of his act was 
originally not to avoid taxation. It follows however that although this may be the 
case, there is an element of double taxation which may be the reason for 
taxpayers to be discouraged by s 7C. Although one does not intend to avoid 
taxation, the double attack in respect of the same transaction would cause one to 
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either attempt to avoid the second leg of taxation (as the belief is that tax has 
already been paid) or be discouraged from using a trust in its entirety. 
 
➢ Let the provisions of s 7C apply to the interest-free loan. As a result of this, the 
lender will suffer donations tax on the interest forgone as per s 7C. The 
exemption of R100 000 is available to the lender for use on an annual basis. 
However, ongoing attribution in terms of s 7 also applies. This option depends on 
whether the lender has funds to satisfy the applicable donations tax. Some of the 
above issues will also be applicable on this option as well. 
 
The above options, although available to a taxpayer, result in a negative impact 
to the taxpayer of either double taxation or dissolution of the trust in their entirely. 
With this in mind, it is supported by this study that the introduction of s 7C will 
result in a material decrease in the uptake of new trusts and where feasible, may 
result in the dissolution of existing trusts. 
 
➢ Embark on a s 42 transaction and interpose a company between a donor and the 
trust. Section 42 is a section in respect of asset-for-share transactions. An asset 
for share transaction is, amongst others, defined in s 42 of the Act as any 
transaction in terms of which a person disposes of an asset to a company which 
is a resident, in exchange for the issue of an equity share in that company and 
that person, upon the disposal of that asset, holds a qualifying interest in that 
company. 
 
This section, in the context of a trust, can be applied where the trust and a 
company enter into an asset-for-share transaction where the trust sells an asset 
to the company and the company issues equity shares to the trust. In effect, the 
trust will become a shareholder in the company. However, in order to give effect 
to the avoidance of s 7C, the shareholding in the company does not meet the 
requirement of paragraph (d)(iv) of the definition of connected person, as 
required by s 7C. In other words, there must not be a shareholding of 20% and 
more between the trust and the company. In this respect, a loan can be 
advanced by the company to the trust without triggering the provisions of s 7C. 
 
In effect and as it currently stands, should there be an interposing company 
between the lender and the trust, s 7C is not applicable. 
 
This loophole was however identified by the industry prior to the effective date of 
s 7C. Structures were immediately embarked on where s 42 was used to avoid s 
7C, prior to its effective date. As such, those taxpayers seem to have avoided s 
7C. This is one of the aspect which renders s 7C ineffective as a company can be 
inserted in the structure to avoid s 7C completely. However, the question is 
whether these taxpayers succeeded in escaping the applicability of s 7C 
permanently? 
 
The regulatory bodies became aware of this loophole and there are proposed 
measures, which were alluded to in the 2017 National Budget Speech that will be 
brought into place to curb this loophole. Although there are proposed measures 
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to be put in place, there are already foreseen issues by the industry in respect of 
the drafting of this proposed measure/s. The issues around this will be discussed 
below.   
 
5.2 Options available to the lender in respect of new funding 
 
Amongst others, the donor of a trust may use the following funding mechanisms – 
 
➢ An outright donation of the loan to the trust and pay donations tax once off and at 
the same time, suffer the attribution in terms of s 7; or 
➢ Sell assets to the trust not on loan account. This is not a very popular funding 
mechanism as most trusts do not have sufficient capital or funds to acquire 
assets and the seller is exposed to capital gains tax implications on the sale of 
the assets. 
 
It follows that should a taxpayer wish to distance himself from the provisions of s 7C by 
not advancing a loan (whether by charging a low interest rate or no interest) he is only 
left with two ways to fund a new trust. As alluded to above, new trusts, in most cases, do 
not have capital or funds to acquire assets from the donor. So in effect, a taxpayer who 
wants to avoid advancing a loan to a new trust is only left with one option, being to 
donate the funds to the trust and suffer donations tax and income tax in respect of the 
attribution rules. 
 
As stated above, it is argued that if the trust is not created for the purposes of avoiding 
tax, then the donor should not be discouraged to pay the donations tax. However, the 
attribution rules further impose income tax. This results in some sort of double taxation, 
as discussed above as well.  
 
However, this ‘double taxation’ has always been in existence as both these provisions of 
the Act have been in existence for a long period of time.  
 
Since a taxpayer wanting to fund a new trust is practically left with only one option of 
donating to the trust, it is clear as to why interest-free or low interest loans are popular 
amongst taxpayers. This was due to the fact that, only s 7 was applicable to such loans 
(in respect to local trusts) and there was no donations tax. This resulted in taxpayers 
exhausting this funding mechanism as there was some sort of avoidance, being estate 
duty (in the form of donations tax). 
 
The introduction of s 7C clearly curbs the avoidance of estate duty. The tables below 
illustrate the taxes applicable prior to and post the introduction of s 7C. 
 
Prior to s 7C 
Type of funding 
mechanism 
Applicability of income 
tax (in terms of s 7) 
Applicability of estate duty (in 
terms of donations tax) 
   
Outright donation to a 
trust 
Sections 7(2), (3) and (4) 
applied 
Donations tax in terms of s 54 
applied 
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This table elaborates that, although a trust may have not been created to avoid taxation, 
there was a loophole for taxpayers, in respect of interest-free or low interest loans to 
local trusts. Offshore trusts have always been covered in terms of s 31. As such, a 
taxpayer will opt for an interest-free or low interest in funding a trust as there would be no 
‘double’ taxation. There would only be income tax as a result of the applicability of s 7 
that will result from this funding mechanism. Post the introduction of s 7C however, it can 
be seen that this loophole has been subsequently closed. The table below elaborates 
this fact. 
 
Post s 7C 
 
 
It can be seen from the above that the regulatory bodies’ intention was to close the 
remaining loophole in respect of interest-free or low interest loans to trusts from an 
estate duty perspective and not for income tax purposes. As such, the introduction of s 
7C has effectively closed this loophole. Although s 7C seems to have closed this door, 
there may be loopholes within s 7C that allow for the avoidance of this section. 
 
5.3 Have all the loopholes which can circumvent s 7C been addressed? 
 
It is well known fact that taxpayers continually create ways to circumvent the applicability 
of any tax legislation in order to minimise their tax exposures and to an extent, avoid 
taxation. As s 7C was implemented to avoid estate duty, it appears from the above 
tables that it may have achieved its purpose barring the fact that there may be loopholes 
in respect of this section. 
 
As discussed above, it has become evident that prior to its effective date, taxpayers had 
already identified structures to circumvent s 7C. One of such structures is by interposing 
a company between a trust and a donor thereby providing loans to trusts using a 
company. In this case and where the connected person requirement of 20 per cent 
equity or voting rights holding is not met, s 7C is avoided in its entirety. 
 
The enacted legislation, as it currently stands, gives effect to this avoidance and deems 
s 7C ineffective as it can be easily avoided by including a company in the trust structure.  
 
Interest-free or low 
interest loan to a trust 
Sections 7(2), (3) and (4) 
applied 
No donations tax is applicable 
Type of funding 
mechanism 
Applicability of income 
tax (in terms of s 7) 
Applicability of estate duty (in 
terms of donations tax) 
   
Outright donation to a 
trust 
Sections 7(2), (3) and (4) 
applied 
Donations tax in terms of s 54 
applied 
Interest-free or low 
interest loan to a trust 
Sections 7(2), (3) and (4) 
applied 
Donations tax in terms of s 7C 
applied 
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However, NT and SARS have already identified this loophole and the Minister of 
Finance, in his 2017 National Budget Speech, alluded to future measures to be put in 
place in order to prevent the use of these structures to avoid the applicability of s 7C. 
 
At the time of writing this research report, such proposed measures were not available 
for perusal and discussion. However, it is already perceived by the industry that a lot of 
care and attention to detail must be afforded in the drafting of these proposed curbing 
measures. 
 
For example, although s 7C may be amended to apply to any company without a 
minimum shareholding, there is plenty of room for taxpayers to be creative in respect of 
debt funding especially where a company is concerned. With a company, debt funding 
may be disguised by a form of, amongst others, hybrid equity instruments, third party 
backed shares in respect of preference shares, hybrid debt instruments and back to back 
loans. Due to the playing field being so wide where companies are concerned, closing 
the one loophole may open other major loopholes. As such, taxpayers anticipate the 
release of an amendment to s 7C where the curbing of the use of interposing companies 
is addressed.  
 
Furthermore, the in duplum rule has also been identified as a potential mode that may 
circumvent s 7C. Although this rule is not legislation, it has also been alluded to in the 
2017 National Budget Speech as a future measure to be addressed to prevent it from 
being used for the avoidance of s 7C. 
 
The above discusses loopholes that have already been identified by the regulatory 
bodies. It follows however that this section is still new and as such and with time, further 
loopholes will be identified and used by taxpayers. 
 
It appears as though that all loopholes have been exposed and may be closed in future. 
However, as with any other section of the Act, not all loopholes are closed until they are 
implemented and identified by the regulatory bodies. This section, just like many others, 
will be continuously amended to prevent the loopholes as they are identified. 
 
 
6. CHAPTER 5 – INTERVIEW RESPONSES FROM TAX SPECIALISTS AND 
PROFESSIONALS WITHIN THE TAX FRATERNITY 
 
Section 7C came into effect from 1 March 2017 and as such it is a very recent 
legislation. The journey to the promulgation of this section was afforded a lot of attention 
and interrogation in the Tax fraternity. The views and opinions of industry bodies and tax 
professionals are important in analysing the effectiveness of this section. The views also 
bring an aspect of practicality in respect of this section. This study embarked on a series 
of interviews with various industry heads and tax professionals who deal, on a frequent 
basis, with s 7C and its impact to their clients or industries. 
 
The study will provide the interview responses from each of the interviewees below and 
an analysis of the responses in the context of the study will follow thereafter. 
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In conducting the interviews, the following interview questions were posed to the 
interviewees: 
 
‘For a number of years, SARS and National Treasury (NT) have been focusing on trust 
structures with the view that there is tax avoidance in respect of these structures. 
Although various measures were indicated to be put in place as evidenced in the Davis 
Tax Committee Report on estate duty and National Budget Speech, s 7C is currently the 
only measure which has recently been promulgated into law. The question that arises is 
whether this section is effective in achieving the purpose of curbing tax avoidance’. 
1. In your view, what are some of the current predicaments that are experienced in 
respect of this legislation? In other words, is this section practically applicable or 
does it bring with it more issues for taxpayers? 
2. Interest-free or low interest loans are not the only way to fund a trust, in your view 
why did SARS and NT settle for s 7C?  
3. The Income Tax Act currently has provisions which apply to interest-free or low 
interest loans such as s 31 and s 7. In your view, what is the interplay between these 
sections and s 7C? Would you say the applicability of these sections would result in 
double taxation for the lender? 
4. As with any other new legislation, taxpayers were already finding ways to avoid s 7C. 
Some of these have been identified and there are proposals to prevent them as 
alluded to in the 2017 National Budget Speech. In your view, have all the loopholes 
of avoiding s 7C been closed? 
5. In your view, does s 7C curb the avoidance of tax through the use of trust structures? 
Would you say that, by introducing s 7C, SARS and NT were successful in curbing 
the avoidance of tax through the use of trusts? 
6. Any general observations you would like me to incorporate into my dissertation?  
 
“It is a school of thought12 that although the section is effective in many aspects, it does 
bring a number of unintended consequences. For example, the section imposes huge 
additional cost to taxpayers who chose to use a trust as a mechanism to protect assets 
that are used by small business enterprises, the so called protective trusts. Another 
issue that arises is that the section is causing liquidity issues where taxpayers may be 
forced to sell some assets in order to fund the tax bill of the deemed donation’. 
However, in my view, s 7C is a neat solution that is easy to administer and implement by 
the regulatory bodies. 
 
In respect of the potential double taxation resulting from this section, one will have to 
tread very careful not to be subject to double taxation. With respect to loopholes, not all 
loopholes have been closed yet. One should also bear in mind that some affected 
taxpayers might just be planning to have the business purpose of their trust preserved, 
which might just be other than a tax purpose. 
 
Ultimately, s 7C is effective in preventing a large degree of estate planning and the 
ultimate minimisation of estate duty. It should be noted that not all uses of trusts were 
                                                          
12  Mr Leon Andre Coetzee who is the Head of Group Tax at FirstRand Bank Limited, the chairperson 
of the Banking Association of South Africa (BASA) and the recently appointed Commercial 
Member of the Tax Court. 
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for the purpose of tax planning. A trust is also a very effective business vehicle to 
protect assets. In my view, SARS and NT have harmed the business use of trusts at the 
gain of stopping the perceived abuse and avoidance of estate duty. The irony is that 
trusts that were set up many years ago will fully escape the net of s 7C as most of the 
funding would have been settled by now. So, the real high value trusts might just have 
achieved their purpose. It is only newly created wealth that SARS will be able to access. 
In this respect, NT should consider how to deal with long existing trusts in order to have 
better equity. It seems that the current generation is punished for all the sins of the past 
by targeting any (tax) planning they embark on”. 
 
“Alluding to some of the above views, a view was further expressed13 to the effect that 
funding of trusts is not always aimed to circumvent or reduce estate duty, as SARS has 
assumed in the information they have supplied. The following examples prove that 
reasons for using trusts are not for the avoidance estate duty – 
 
i. Holiday home – a trust is a far more enduring arrangement than a company or 
partnership. Many families jointly own a holiday home, and the intention was to 
prevent an undivided interest falling into a deceased estate, every time a 
beneficiary passes on. A trust is a far more enduring holding entity and the 
current primary residence carve out does not cater for holiday homes held in a 
trust for reasons totally unrelated to estate duty; 
ii. Many farms could not be subdivided, and a trust was the best alternative. Farms 
which are held in trust to ensure all children of the entire family have access to 
the land that may not be divided into smaller portions. However, the loans that 
arose from these trusts remained in place and were bequeathed as such to the 
next generation; the current owner of the loan faces the implications of s 7C and 
one day, when sold, the attribution of the CGT as well.  
 
Should these trusts (farms and holiday homes) be charged interest, the trust 
may be technically insolvent within time as there is no third party income or 
rental. Where the trust owns listed shares and unlisted shares, paying interest is 
not tax efficient. There is thus no tax deduction in the trust to match to the 
taxable income now taxed in the funder’s name. It follows that s 7C can result in 
technical insolvency should the trust pay interest and not earn any income.  
 
NT lost faith in the SARS’ application of s 7 (or the failure to apply) and the Woulidge 
case was on file but never applied as well. It is evidenced that the law was in place, yet 
SARS never applied it or failed to implement a team to address the tax issues facing a 
trust. It follows further that NT and SARS have a warped understanding of the true 
reasons behind a trust being used. As such, they only recognised the perceived estate 
duty saving, whilst completely failing to understand the comments by the Davis Tax 
Committee on the attribution rules, being the tax saving rules. 
  
Although unintended, the double taxation risk is between s 7(8) on the one hand and ss 
7C and 31 on the other. Due to the unsubstantiated view by the regulatory bodies, this 
                                                          
13  Mr Hugo Van Zyl, a Local and Global Solutions Specialist in the FNB Fiduciary division of First 
National Bank. 
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section is not effective as very few families will incur the cost and compliance challenges 
purely to save tax as there is a non-tax reason for the formation of a trust”. 
 
“Another school of thought was expressed14 that the biggest problem for taxpayers is 
that they are effectively locked into structures that they are unable to extricate 
themselves from without significant costs. To illustrate, where a taxpayer has made an 
interest-free loan to a trust, they face the implications of s 7C by way of a deemed 
donation if they don't levy interest while levying interest may be inefficient and result in a 
tax cost in excess of the deemed donation. Waiving the loan may result in donations tax 
immediately on the full amount of the capital, while the trust may not be able to repay 
the loan without disposing of assets. To make matters worse, certain of these trust 
arrangements may not have been the primary target of this provision (see below). An 
example of such a scenario would be where the trust has been set up for the benefit of a 
child to which a duty of care is owed, but is not a special trust. Other examples include 
trusts set up for purposes of trading (as opposed to using a company form) and trusts 
set up for employee share schemes. In summary, the provision achieves its purpose, 
but catches unintended targets as well and makes it difficult for taxpayers to restructure 
their affairs without significant tax implications. 
 
The only other ways to fund a trust would be through interest-bearing loans or 
contributions, both of which would have tax implications in the form of income tax or 
donations tax. Interest-free loans have long been used as a mechanism to avoid estate 
duty and donations tax by avoiding a donation and by pegging the value of an estate at 
the value of the loan, allowing assets to grow in the trust free of estate duty and 
donations tax. The DTC identified interest-free loans as a problem from an estate duty 
perspective and recommended that the assets of a trust funded with such loans should 
be deemed to be the assets of the lender on death for estate duty purposes. 
 
Of course, this proposal would have been extremely burdensome both for administrators 
of deceased estates and SARS. Section 7C was therefore a neater solution by dealing 
with the implications of the interest-free loan upfront. It must be borne in mind that the 
Supreme Court of Appeal has consistently held that an interest-free loan is an ongoing 
donation of the interest foregone in terms of our common law. In principle, therefore, 
SARS could have challenged such loans on the basis of existing law and sought to levy 
donations tax. However, this approach would necessitate a facts and circumstances test 
in each case as to the appropriate interest rate. Section 7C provides a neater solution 
by deeming a specific rate of interest (the official rate) to apply for this purpose, 
essentially reducing the common law principle to statute and closing the loophole.  
 
This is a relatively simple and neat solution to the problem of interest-free loans being 
used as a mechanism to avoid estate duty and donations tax. 
 
It is not intended that there should be double taxation. Section 7C ((5)(e) makes s 7C 
subject to s 31, which includes a secondary adjustment in the form of a deemed 
donation or dividend, depending on whether the lender is a company or other person. In 
such circumstances, s 7C would clearly not apply and no double taxation would arise. 
                                                          
14 Mr Kyle Mandy who is a Partner at PwC. 
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Insofar as s 7 is concerned, it must be borne in mind that these two provisions address 
different taxes. Section 7 has the effect that the income arising from an interest-free loan 
is taxed in the hands of the lender and not in the hands of the borrower. However, 
legally, such income and assets remain the property of the trust and s 7C recognises 
this by deeming the interest foregone to have been donated to the trust. The situation is 
no different from that would have applied had the amount of the loan been donated 
rather than lent to the trust. In such circumstances, donations tax would apply to the 
capital donated and s 7 would apply to the income derived from such donation. 
 
Loopholes have not all been closed, although interposing a company under the trust 
was the most obvious solution for addressing existing structures. However, the 
possibility of using companies for new structures remains through the use of funding 
instruments other than loans. Other mechanisms for avoiding the tax will continue to 
present themselves and are likely to become increasingly complex given the 
involvement of high networth individuals and the amounts involved. The general anti-
avoidance regulations ordinarily referred to as GAAR provisions will, however, always 
be a backstop to this anti-avoidance provision. 
 
Section 7C is likely to go some way to the avoidance of estate duty and donations tax 
through the use of trusts. However, it will not address the issue insofar as trusts that 
have managed to eliminate or reduce any loans to an inconsequential level in 
comparison to the value of their assets are concerned. Such trusts will still achieve the 
objective of avoiding estate duty by skipping multiple generations. Further measures will 
likely be required in this regard. It must also be borne in mind that the provision does not 
address the use of trusts to avoid income tax, which remains a concern to the Davis Tax 
Committee, SARS and National Treasury”. 
 
The interview process progressed to conducting interviews with two of the well-known 
specialists in the tax fraternity.  
 
They shared their views as follows: 
 
15Existing loans were able to escape the provisions of s 7C as taxpayers embarked on s 
42 restructurings prior to the effective date of s 7C, as such they may have avoided s 
7C. In his view, new loans that are advanced from 1 March 2017 have no escape 
mechanism. 
 
He however pointed out that although the existing loans may seem to have avoided s 
7C, these restructurings may be attacked by SARS on two basis, one on the GAAR 
principles in that the sole purpose of the restructurings was for the avoidance of tax and 
secondly on the fact that s 42 may have not been applied accurately. 
 
He acknowledges however that it may be difficult for SARS to prove the existence of a 
tax benefit. However, should the basis of ‘impermissible tax avoidance’ or ‘connected 
persons and accommodating or tax-indifferent parties’ be used, perhaps an argument 
for GAAR may hold. 
                                                          
15 Mr Dan Foster, a Tax Director at Webber Wentzel. 
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With respect to the use of s 42 for restructuring for purposes of avoiding s 7C, the view 
is that many taxpayers may have overlooked the requirements in respect of qualifying 
debt and this may have been applied incorrectly. There is the 18 months requirement 
and the pledging of security requirement, where taxpayers do not always pay closer 
attention to. In this respect, some of the s 42 restructures that were embarked on may 
not be compliant. The question in this respect is whether SARS will be able to pick these 
up as it is then the job of SARS to ensure the accuracy and validity of these structures. 
 
In effect, the view is that s 7C, as it currently applies, is not at all effective as it can be 
merely avoided by the insertion of an interposing company in the trust structure thereby 
defeating the applicability of s 7C. However, s 7C is the right answer for estate duty 
avoidance. Post the insertion of the provisions to curb the use of interposing companies, 
s 7C will be effective only in its respect as a technical section but it will remain 
ineffective in its practicality. 
 
With a different perspective16, it was alluded to the fact that s 7C was in principle 
brought in to curb the avoidance of estate duty. The section forces lenders to charge 
interest on loans whereas the charging of interest is optional to the lender and should 
remain the case. This is substantiated by the reference to the Katz Commission. 
Although s 7C targets the avoidance of estate duty, CGT on death already taxes the 
taxpayers’ wealth. As such, the need for s 7C is questioned as it creates practicality 
issues for taxpayers to apply this section. There is a concern of the insertion of s 7C in 
the Act whilst it is a provision aimed at estate duty. As such, an incorrect impression is 
created that s 7C was brought in to curb the avoidance of taxation. 
 
The regulatory bodies have not substantiated their perceived view of tax or estate duty 
avoidance. Calculations have been conducted to attempt to elaborate this view. As a 
result, the findings were that more tax is actually accrued by SARS through the use of 
trusts by taxpayers and as such, the perceived view of tax avoidance is not justified. In 
effect, SARS gets more out of trust structures than lose out. 
 
It was emphasised that if the regulatory bodies conducted extensive homework they 
would realise the real reason for the creation of trusts by taxpayers, which is for asset 
protection than the avoidance of any tax. It was questioned what the regulatory bodies 
would do should taxpayers dissolve their trusts and put all their wealth in the possession 
of their children? Would the legislation be subsequently amended to catch these 
structures? 
 
Issues have been experienced whereby the impact of s 7C is unaffordable by lenders or 
trusts due to liquidity issues. In this respect, s 7C is challenged and it was proposed that 
perhaps s 7C should not have been promulgated and instead, there should be an 
imputation of a growth of 8 per cent on the value of the loan on an annual basis. The tax 
on this growth will then be obtained by SARS upon the death of the lender through 
estate duty or where applicable, CGT on death. 
 
                                                          
16 Adv. Gert Van Den Bergh (Advocate) who is a director at Delport Van Den Bergh. 
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It is a general view that the regulatory bodies lack a full understanding of trusts and as 
such, they resorted to a convenient provision which will satisfy a hunger of immediate 
collection of tax whilst at the same time, will result in a negative impact on trust 
structures. 
 
Section 7C is a good way of achieving the purpose of immediate collection of estate 
duty although the impact of this was not considered. It is evident that administering the 
current provisions in the Act on taxpayer’s affairs is a big issue for the regulatory bodies 
and if this is not resolved, we stand to see sections of such nature being continuously 
inserted into the Act. In the context of s 7C and the avoidance of estate duty, it was 
acknowledged that this may be the end of any further work by the regulatory bodies.    
 
It is evidenced from the interview responses that there are issues with s 7C and the 
constant view is that the Act already consists of relevant sections which the regulatory 
bodies could use in achieving the same purpose that s 7C is aimed at achieving. The 
issues around the affordability of the tax burden are a general theme which the 
regulatory bodies do not seem to seek to entertain. It is also a general view that s 7C is 
currently ineffective however it will, in the future, be effective. However, it remains the 
view that this section is merely a neater and more convenient section for the regulatory 
bodies to cover their failure to administer the application of the currently existing 
provisions in the Act. 
   
 
7. CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Does s 7C achieve the goal of SARS and NT in curbing the avoidance of 
taxation through the use of trust structures? 
 
Section 7C only focusses on one type of funding mechanism whilst there are other ways 
of funding trusts. However, the Act already consists of sections therein that subject 
these funding mechanisms to taxation. 
 
Due to their warped understanding of trust structures, the regulatory bodies based their 
perceived view of tax abuse and to an extent the abuse of estate duty mainly on the 
popularity of trust structures and a particular trust funding mechanism, being the 
advancing of interest-free or low interest loans. 
 
Although the perceived avoidance is unsubstantiated, the study above elaborates that 
interest-free and low interest loans to local trusts was the only remaining funding 
mechanism which did not give rise to an immediate estate duty. As such, the 
introduction is effective in curbing the only door that remained opened for abuse by 
taxpayers. There are, however, other ways to collect this tax without damaging the 
existence of trust structures. 
 
This section brought with it various issues in respect of potential differences regarding 
interpretations of some provisions, a risk of dissolution of trusts and potential double 
taxation. Furthermore and as it stands, companies can be used to completely avoid the 
application of s 7C. It must be noted that it is the ultra-wealthy trusts where there would 
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ordinarily be an interposing company. As such, it can be argued that it is in these trusts 
that the regulatory bodies have a chance of collecting material donations tax in respect 
of s 7C. 
 
However, interposing companies nullify the applicability of s 7C in respect of trusts 
where most equity is sitting. This completely renders this section ineffective currently 
and takes away the opportunity of the regulatory bodies to collect feasible donations tax. 
 
It is a concluding view that this section will be effective upon the inclusion of the curbing 
measures in respect of interposing companies. It follows however that should it be failed 
to apply the required care and attention in drafting these curbing measures, s 7C could 
be an inadequate section in the Act.   
 
Depending on the anticipated future amendments in respect of companies, it is a 
temporary view that s7C will be effective in curbing the unsubstantiated avoidance of 
estate duty. 
 
However, the build up to s 7C created an impression that the regulatory bodies perceive 
an avoidance of taxation through the use of trusts, and not so much estate duty. Section 
7C is the resultant legislation of this build up. As such, an impression was created in the 
industry that this section was brought in to curb the avoidance of tax, as could be seen 
in the first draft of this section, where the forgone interest constituted gross income. 
 
As such and although the provisions of s 7C are somewhat effective in limiting the 
immediate avoidance of estate duty, the regulatory bodies have completely not focused 
on the avoidance of taxation through the use of trusts. As such, s 7C is not at all 
effective in the curbing of the avoidance of taxation. This could perhaps indicate that 
future legislation may be inserted in the Act, with the aim of curbing the avoidance of 
taxation. Perhaps the work of the regulatory bodies on trusts is not done. 
 
It is therefore concluded that, although s 7C will in future be effective in curbing the 
avoidance of estate duty, it is more of a convenient, easier and neater to administer 
section for the regulatory bodies. In essence, the Act consists of provisions applicable to 
curbing the perceived abuse and there is no reason for the regulatory bodies to seek to 
punish the taxpayers by imposing immediate estate duty, which can be obtained at a 
later stage and in doing so, avoid the risk of the continuation of trust structures. 
 
Perhaps South African tax legislation is headed towards a direction where immediate 
revenue collections prevail over the long term sustainability of structures which are of 
value to both taxpayers and the regulatory bodies, in respect of estate planning and 
durable tax collections.  
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8. APPENDICES  
 
The following citations were referred to in the study and not a lot of detail was 
elaborated in relation to their subjects: 
  
 
Brummeria Renaissance (Pty) Ltd, C: SARS v 2007 (6) SA 601 (SCA),  
69 SATC 205 (SCA), [2007] 4 All SA 1338 (SCA), (2007) 69 SATC 205 
 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’) initiatives and 
comments on Base-Erosion and Profit-Shifting (‘BEPS’) 
 
The Common Law of Trusts 
 
The Hague Convention 
 
Roman-Dutch civil Law 
 
Law of Contract 
 
Section 25B(1) of the Income Tax Act 
 
The Katz Commission 
 
The estate duty Act 
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